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ADDING CHARGES ON RETRIAL: DOUBLE
JEOPARDY, INTERSTITIALISM, AND STATE V. LYNCH
CARA MICKELSEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Lynch,' the New Mexico Supreme Court found the New Mexico
Constitution's double jeopardy clause' provides a greater safeguard than does the
Fifth Amendment3 of the United States Constitution.4 Following New Mexico's
interstitial approach to constitutional analysis,5 the court analyzed state law only
after finding no federal protection.6 The court held that after a successful appeal of
a conviction, retrial cannot proceed on greater charges than the one for which the
defendant was originally convicted. 7 This case is one of first impression in New
Mexico.' While New Mexico double jeopardy law has departed from federal jurisprudence, Lynch provides New Mexico's first departure from federal law based on
the unique language in the second clause of the New Mexico Constitution, article
II, section 15.9 Lynch provides a new and distinctive state protection from double
jeopardy' but also presents a problem with New Mexico's interstitial approach,
because the New Mexico Constitution provides a strong argument for protection but
the federal law is less clear."
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 15, 1996, Martin Lynch and Richard Gurley engaged in a fistfight that
ended in Gurley's death. 2 At the time, Lynch was living with Gurley's wife, from
whom Gurley was separated. 13 Lynch and Gurley had a heated telephone conversation earlier that day, after which Gurley and his brother went to Lynch's home. 4
Once there, Gurley "pounded on the door and front windows, yelling for [Lynch]

* Class of 2005, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. 2003-NMSC-020, 74 P.3d 73.
2. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020,
11, 24, 74 P.3d at 76-77, 80.
5. See infra notes 33-35, 233-241, and accompanying text; see also State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006,
1 20-21,932 P.2d 1, 7.
6. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020,1 13, 74 P.3d at 77.
7. Id. 1 15, 74 P.3d at 77-78.
8. Only one case has directly addressed the federal issue. That case is Lowery v. Estelle, 696 F.2d 333 (5th
Cir. 1983), discussed infra notes 110-114 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of the United States has
decided that in some circumstances the right to be free from double jeopardy afforded under the United States
Constitution is violated by retrial after implied acquittal, i.e. when multiple offenses are charged and the jury
returns a verdict as to some, but not all, of the charges, but no mistrial is granted. See infra note 67 and
accompanying text. In Lynch, the defendant was not charged with both offenses in his first trial. See infra note 17.
9. See infra notes 73-75, 155-156,226, and accompanying text; see also Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020,1 41,
74 P.3d at 85 (Maes,C.J., dissenting) (noting only one case, State v. Martinez, 120 N.M. 677,905 P.2d 715 (1995),
has interpreted this language, and it did not provide a departure from federal law).
10. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
11. See discussion infra Part V.B.
12. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 2, 74 P.3d at 74-75.
13. Id. 2, 74 P.3d at 74.
14. Id. 2, 74 P.3d at 75.
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to come out and fight." 15 Lynch did, and during the altercation that ensued, Lynch
fatally stabbed Gurley. 6
Lynch was charged with second-degree murder. 17He was tried and convicted by
a jury, but his conviction was reversed by the New Mexico Court of Appeals on the
ground that the jury should have been instructed on self-defense.18 On remand, the
prosecutor sought to charge Lynch with first-degree murder based on new
evidence: 9 the testimony of Ginger Dickinson 20 that Lynch had previously said he
was going to kill Gurley "by stabbing him with a single thrust."'"
Lynch moved to dismiss the first-degree murder charge on the grounds of double
jeopardy and prosecutorial vindictiveness. 22 The court denied that motion and subsequently denied two motions for reconsideration of Lynch's double jeopardy
claim. 23 Lynch appealed the double jeopardy ruling and the court of appeals
certified that question to the New Mexico Supreme Court based on an apparent

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. 913, 74 P.3d at 75; see also NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1 (1994) (first-degree and second-degree murder).
Although the complaint was initially filed as an open count of first-degree murder, Lynch was bound over and
charged in the information with second-degree murder, a charge that includes manslaughter. Lynch, 2003-NMSC020, 9 3, 24, 74 P.3d at 75, 80; see State v. Stephens, 93 N.M. 458, 461, 601 P.2d 428, 431 (1979) ("[Defendant]
was entitled to an instruction on [a lesser-included offense] if there was some evidence in the record to support it.")
(citing State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 (1979)); see also UJI 14-210 NMRA 2004.
18. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 14, 74 P.3d at 75.
19. The State did not have a full interview of its new witness until August of 1999, after the reversal of
Lynch's original conviction, and a short time before his scheduled retrial. State's Answer Brief at 6, Lynch (No.
26,252); Brief in Chief at 5, Lynch (No. 26,252). Her testimony concerned a conversation that took place prior to
Gurley's death. Id. at 7-8; State's Answer Brief at 6, Lynch (No. 26,252).
20. Ginger Dickinson was a family friend of sorts: at the time of Gurley's death, Dickinson was dating the
stepfather of Lynch's girlfriend. Lynch's girlfriend was also, of course, Gurley's estranged wife. Lynch, 2003NMSC-020, (fl 2, 5, 74 P.3d at 74-75. Her testimony was brought into question in Lynch's brief to the New
Mexico Supreme Court on several grounds: the time she came forward, Brief in Chief at 8-9, 26, Lynch (No.
26,252); her expressed dislike for Lynch, id. at 11, 26; and reliability based on her character, id. at 27.
21. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 5,74 P.3d at 75. Dickinson's testimony was that Lynch asked her for a gun
to kill Gurley, and, when she refused, he said he would kill Gurley by stabbing him the way he had learned in
prison. Brief in Chief at 8, Lynch (No. 26,252); State's Answer Brief at 6, Lynch (No. 26,252).
22. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 1 6, 74 P.3d at 75. The United States Constitution's Due Process Clause
protects defendants in criminal cases from prosecutorial vindictiveness, i.e., action by the prosecution taken in
retaliation for a defendant's exercise of any right, such as the right to appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin,
457 U.S. 368, 372-85 (1982); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362-65 (1978); Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21,25-32 (1974); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,
721 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 803 (1989); State v. Brule, 1999NMSC-026, 981 P.2d 782; State v. Lujan, 103 N.M. 667,672-74, 712 P.2d 13, 18-20 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985). See
generally JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, JR., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT §§ 3.30-32 (2d ed. 1999). Prosecutorial
vindictiveness may be difficult to prove because it requires a showing of improper motive. Goodwin, 475 U.S. at
373 (establishing a presumption of vindictiveness in some instances to ameliorate this difficulty). While the
majority and the dissent agreed that Lynch's prosecutorial vindictiveness claim was not before the court in this
appeal, the dissent reasoned that although double jeopardy protections do not prevent retrial for first-degree murder,
due process protections against prosecutorial vindictiveness might apply. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, IN 25, 46, 74
P.3d at 81, 86.
23. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 1 6, 74 P.3d at 75.
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contradiction24 in New Mexico's double jeopardy law.25 In State v. Lynch, the New
Mexico Supreme Court thus decided whether the federal or state constitution's
double jeopardy clause precludes retrial for a greater degree of the same offense
after reversal of a conviction of the lesser degree, when the greater degree was not
charged in the original trial. 26 The court held that the state, but not federal,
constitution protects Lynch from retrial.27
IH. BACKGROUND
State v. Lynch deals with the federal Constitution's prohibition against double
jeopardy as well as the New Mexico Constitution's double jeopardy clause.28
Because state constitutions can provide more protections than the Constitution of
the United States,29 federal law should be analyzed separately from state law.3"
States have taken three main approaches to the analysis of state constitutions: (1)
the lock-step approach requiring that state constitutional provisions be analyzed as
if they are the same as parallel federal provisions;3 ' (2) the primacy approach,
looking first to state constitutional rights while allowing examination of federal
constitutional law as persuasive, but not binding, authority; 32 and (3) the interstitial
approach,3 3 treating the state constitution as supplemental to the federal and
providing state analysis only when there is no federal protection.34 New Mexico has
adopted the interstitial approach requiring that federal constitutional claims be
analyzed first, and state claims be analyzed only when federal claims fail.35

24. The court of appeals was concerned because language in Martinez stating that double jeopardy
"precludes retrial of a greater offense only after an acquittal of that offense," 120 N.M. at 678, 905 P.2d at 716,
seems antithetical to the New Mexico Constitution's article fl, section 15, prohibition of retrial "for an offense or
degree of the offense greater than the one of which he was convicted," N.M. CONST. art. I, § 15. See also infra
notes 164-173 and accompanying text.
25. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 17, 74 P.3d at 75.
26. Id. (H 1, 3, 74 P.3d at 74-75.
27. Id. 71 11, 21, 74 P.3d at 77, 79; see infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
28. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 8, 74 P.3d at 75-76; see supra note 26 and accompanying text. While the
decision in Lynch is supported by examination of a New Mexico statute, see infra notes 184-194 and
accompanying text, it is based primarily on the New Mexico Constitution's double jeopardy clause, N.M. CONST.
art. 1I, § 15, see infra notes 157-163 and accompanying text.
29. State ex rel. Serna v. Hodges, 89 N.M. 351, 356, 552 P.2d 787, 792 (1976); William J. Brennan, Jr.,
The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutionsas GuardiansofIndividual Rights,61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 535, 548 (1986).
30. Brennan, supra note 29; JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES § 1-3(c) (2d ed. 1996).
31. See generally FRIESEN, supra note 30, § 1-6(b). The lockstep approach was formerly New Mexico's
approach. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006,1 16, 932 P.2d 1, 6.
32. FRIESEN, supra note 30, § 1-6(a).
33. This approach is also called the "supplemental" or "independent" method to constitutional analysis. Id.
§ 1-6(c) n. 189.
34. Id. § 1-6(c).
35. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, IN 20-21, 932 P.2d at 7.
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A. The Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution
Prohibition of double jeopardy existed in common law England36 and continues
today, albeit with many modem developments." The Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution 3 8provides that no person "shall...be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. '39 The Fourteenth Amendment' incorporated
the Fifth and made it applicable to the states.4 1 The federal courts have interpreted
the constitutional freedom from double jeopardy to include three basic types of protections: (1) "against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal"; 2
(2) "against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction"; 43 and (3)
"against multiple punishments for the same offense."" The policy underlying all
areas of double jeopardy law is the same:
[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.45
Federal precedent has become quite complex,' but three lines of cases provide
some insight into the problem presented in Lynch. Those cases involve (1) retrial
after conviction,47 (2) retrial after mistrial,4 8 and (3) retrial after appeal.49

36. The roots of double jeopardy may be "traced to Greek and Roman times." Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 795 (1969); see also Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 728-29 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (roots
of double jeopardy may be traced "back to the days of Demosthenes").
37. See generally JOSEPH G. COOK, CONsTrruTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 29:1 (3d ed. 1996).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
39. Id.
40. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. Benton, 395 U.S. at 794.
42. Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 306 (1984) (citing Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S.
410, 415 (1980)); accord Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717 (citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); United
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896)).
43. Lydon, 466 U.S. at 306 (citing Vitale, 447 U.S. at 415); accord Pearce,395 U.S. at 717 (citing In re
Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889)).
44. Lydon, 466 U.S. at 307 (citing Vitale, 447 U.S. at 415); accord Pearce,395 U.S. at 717 (citing United
States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931); Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); United States v. Sacco,
367 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Adams, 362 F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 1966); Kennedy v. United States, 330
F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1964)).
45. Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88.
46. Whalen, 445 U.S. at 699 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("[The double jeopardy clause] seems both one of
the least understood and, in recent years, one of the most frequently litigated provisions of the Bill of Rights. This
Court has done little to alleviate the confusion, and our opinions.. .are replete with mea culpa'soccasioned by shifts
in assumptions and emphasis.").
47. See infra Part III.A.I. Lynch did not address this line of cases, but the cases concern analogous
situations: in order to prevent a chilling effect on the right to appeal, see infra text accompanying note 135, double
jeopardy protections after appeal should be essentially the same as those before appeal, to the extent that is
consistent with public policy concerns. See infra notes 135-148 and accompanying text.
48. See infra Part llI.A.2. This line of cases is also relevant, though in a more limited way. The
differentiation between mistrial initiated by the defense and that initiated by the prosecution or the court is
particularly enlightening with respect to two cases the Lynch court examines: Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400
(1987), see infra notes 115-124 and accompanying text, and State v. Martinez, 120 N.M. 677, 905 P.2d 715
(1995), see infra notes 82-89, 164-173, and accompanying text.
49. See infra Part III.A.3. Lynch focused on this line of cases, see infra notes 106-108 and accompanying
text, and they are perhaps the most directly on point.

Summer 2004]

ADDING CHARGES ON RETRIAL

1. Retrial after Conviction
It was established early in precedent that for the purposes of doublejeopardy, the
"same offense" does not mean merely violation of the same statute.50 Blockburger
v. United States5 established the "same evidence" test: if proof of each statutory
violation "requires proof of a fact which the other does not," the offenses are separ523
v. Ohio, 3 applying the Blockburger"same evidence" test, held that, "if
ate." Brown
two offenses are the same," 4 they must be charged in one proceeding as double
jeopardy will preclude a second trial.55 Conviction of a greater offense is barred
after conviction of a lesser-included offense, just as conviction of a lesser-included
offense is barred after conviction of a greater offense, because these different
charges are considered one offense for double jeopardy purposes.5 6
2. Retrial after Mistrial
Retrial of the same offense, however, is not barred after a mistrial in many
circumstances. 57 United States v. Perez58 established the current rule: when a mistrial is declared as a matter of "manifest necessity," retrial does not violate double
jeopardy under the federal Constitution. 9 Courts have looked at many factors to
determine when a manifest necessity exists,6" but the question of most importance
for our current purposes is which party prompted the mistrial.6 1 Generally, when the

50. COOK, supra note 37, § 29:37.
51. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
52. Id. at 304. This test was originally applied to cumulative sentencing considerations but was later adopted
to determine when multiple proceedings are precluded. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRMINAL PROCEDURE § 17.4(b)
(1999).
53. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
54. Id. at 166. In Brown, the Court found that joyriding ("operating a vehicle without the owner's consent")
was a lesser-included offense of auto theft, because "auto theft consists ofjoyriding with the [additional element
of] intent permanently to deprive the owner of possession." Id. at 167. Since proof of auto theft necessitates proof
of joyriding, they are the same offense for the purposes of double jeopardy. Id.
55. Id. at 166. There may be exceptions to this rule for special circumstances: when the greater offense could
not be brought at the time of the first trial because an element had not yet occurred or when the defendant
successfully opposed consolidation of the charges. Id. at 165-69 nn.5-7; Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137
(1977). See generally COOK, supranote 37, § 29:37. Another exception may be made for the discovery of new
evidence after the first trial, despite the use of due diligence. Brown, 432 U.S. at 169 n.7. See generally COOK,
supra note 37, § 29:37. These exceptions have been addressed only rarely; in New Mexico, they have been
discussed but never applied. See, e.g., State v. Manzanares, 100 N.M. 621,622,674 P.2d 511, 512 (1983) (noting
existence of "necessary facts" exception but focusing on another exception for the jurisdictional inability of
magistrate courts to hear felony cases); see also Brief in Chief at 24-25, Lynch (No. 26,252) (listing New Mexico
cases that recognize but do not apply the "necessary facts" exception).
56. Brown, 432 U.S. at 168-69, 166.
57. See generallyCOOK, supra note 37, §§ 29:15-:24.
58. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
59. Id. at 580.
60. Factors include, but are not limited to: (1) prejudice to the defendant, see, e.g., Lovato v. New Mexico,
242 U.S. 199, 201 (1916); (2) court consideration of alternatives, see, e.g., United States v. Join, 400 U.S. 470,
486-87 (1971); (3) the reason for granting the mistrial, see, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 507-13
(1978); and (4) whether the defendant has consented and, thus, waived double jeopardy protections, see, e.g.,
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672-79 (1982). See generally COOK, supra note 37, §§ 29:15-:24.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611-12 (1976). See generallyCOOK, supra note 37,
§§ 29:18-:20.
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defendant creates the need for mistrial, retrial does not constitute double jeopardy.62
Similarly, when the defendant requests a mistrial or consents to such, retrial may
proceed without double jeopardy implications, because consent is a waiver of
double jeopardy protections.63

3. Retrial after Appeal
Generally, retrial after reversal of the same offense is permitted because an
appeal is considered to be a waiver of double jeopardy protections with respect to
the charge appealed. 64 Retrial is not permitted, however, when the reversal is on the
ground of insufficiency of the evidence.65 A finding that the evidence was insufficient for conviction is essentially a finding of acquittal.66 While reversal on appeal
for grounds other than insufficiency of the evidence permits retrial, that retrial is
sometimes restricted to the charge appealed; when the jury in the first trial was
silent on one of multiple charges, the silence is sometimes taken as an implied
acquittal of that charge.67

B. The New Mexico Constitution and Double Jeopardy Statute

The first Bill of Rights promulgated in New Mexico, often called the Kearny Bill
of Rights,6 8 prohibited double jeopardy with language different from the United
States Constitution but having the same import. 69 The New Mexico Constitution
was drafted in 1910,70 and, like most state constitutions, 7' it contains a double
jeopardy provision. 72 Unlike most, 73 however, its language is significantly different
from that of the federal Constitution.74 The New Mexico Constitution provides:

62. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611.
63. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485.
64. Ball, 163 U.S. at 672; see also Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 328 (1970); Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 191-92 (1957). See generally COOK, supra note 37, § 29:27.
65. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1978). See generally COOK, supra note 37, § 29:28.
66. Burks, 437 U.S. at 16.
67. See, e.g., Price, 398 U.S. at 328-29; Green, 355 U.S. at 190-91; see also infra notes 129-136 and
accompanying text.
68. Brigadier General Stephen Watts Kearny led the U.S. troops into Santa Fe in August of 1846 after he
dissuaded Mexican forces from offering resistance and remained in New Mexico to establish the first territorial
government. ROBERT W. LARSON, NEW MEXICO'S QUEST FOR STATEHOOD 1-6 (1968). The Kearny Bill of Rights
was part of the Kearny Code, a set of laws issued by General Kearny in September of 1846 that incorporated both
Mexican and U.S. law. Id. at 4-5.
69. KEARNY BILL OF RIGHTS, cl. 8 (1846) ("[N]o person after having once been acquitted by a jury can be
tried a second time for the same offense.").
70. CHUCK SMITH, THE NEW MEXICO STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 12-13 (1996). On
January 6, 1912, President Taft signed a proclamation that made New Mexico a state. LARSON, supra note 68, at
304 (1968). Before the 1910 constitution, state constitutions were drafted in 1872 and 1889, and each contained
language essentially the same as the federal Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy. Lynch, 2003NMSC-020, 33, 74 P.3d at 82 (Maes, C.J., dissenting). The timing of the 1910 draft, and its relation to Green
v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), and Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905), is discussed infra notes
209-212, 222-223, and accompanying text.
71.

N.M. CONST. art. 1I, § 15; RICHARD B. MCNAMARA, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE § 15:13 (1982).
72. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15.
73. Id. art. 11,§ 15; FRIESEN, supra note 30, § 12-7 n.197 and accompanying text.
74.

Compare N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15 with U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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No person shall.. .be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; and when the
indictment, information or affidavit upon which any person is convicted charges
different offenses or different degrees of the same offense and a new trial is
granted the accused, he may not again be tried for an offense or degree of the
offense greater than the one of which he was convicted.75

Because the New Mexico Constitution contains language not present in the federal
Constitution, it may be interpreted more broadly under New Mexico's interstitial
approach.76

In addition to article II, section 15, New Mexico has long had a statutory
Mexico legislature enacted a
protection from double jeopardy. In 1963, the New
77
major revision of the New Mexico Criminal Code. Included was section 30-1-10,78
a statute much like79article H1, section 15 of the New Mexico Constitution, but with
minor differences:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same crime. The defense of
double jeopardy may not be waived and may be raised by the accused at any
stage of a criminal prosecution, either before or after judgment. When the
indictment, information or complaint charges different crimes or different
degrees of the same crime and a new trial is granted the accused, he may not
again be tried for a crime or degree of the crime greater than the one of which
he was originally convicted. 0

The differences between article II, section 15 and section 30-1-10, though minor,
must be construed as providing more expansive protections than those afforded
under article II, section 15.8"

75. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15.
76. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, H 20-21,932 P.2d at 7. The Gomez court listed three grounds for deviation
from the federal constitution, "a flawed federal analysis, structural differences between state and federal
government, or distinctive state characteristics," id. 19, but expressly declined to hold that those are the only
grounds for departure. Id. 1 23 n.3. Because the third reason for divergence is met, i.e., the New Mexico
Constitution's unique language, the Lynch court did not decide whether other grounds would suffice. Lynch, 2003NMSC-020, 14, 74 P.3d at 77.
77. See Act of Mar. 25, 1963, ch. 303, § 1-10, NM Laws 1963, 832 (adopting a new criminal code,
including NMSA 1978, § 30-1-10 (1963)).
78. NMSA 1978, § 30-1-10 (1963).
79. The first sentence of section 30-1-10 substitutes "crime" for "offense" but is otherwise the same as New
Mexico's constitution. The second is new-there is no constitutional equivalent. This sentence seems at first like
an appropriate procedural embellishment on article HI,section 15, but given the prominence of the waiver theory
in double jeopardy jurisprudence, it may convey more than procedure. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
The third sentence is largely the same, but the statute substitutes "complaint" for "affidavit" and "crime" for
"offense" and, more notably, deletes the language "upon which any person is convicted," while adding the word
"originally." For a discussion of some of these differences, see infra notes 184-194 and accompanying text.
80. NMSA 1978, § 30-1-10 (1963) (originally enacted as NMSA 1953, § 40A-1-10 (1963)). Prior to 1963,
New Mexico had a former jeopardy statute (NMSA 1941, § 42-705 (repealed 1963)) that prohibited a second
indictment for the same offense after acquittal, but that statute had no specific language relevant in Lynch's
situation.
81. Omission of words presumably indicates a change in meaning. See generally NORMAN J. SINGER,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.02 (6th ed. 2000). Because statutes cannot limit the constitution,
section 30-1-10 must have expanded the double jeopardy protections provided by article 1I, section 15. See also
N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't v. Whitener, 117 N.M. 130, 134,569 P.2d 829 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) ("The State
cannot restrict an individual's constitutional rights by statute.") (citing State v. Barber, 108 N.M. 709,710-11,778
P.2d 456, 457-58 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989)); State v. Santillanes, 96 N.M. 482, 486, 632 P.2d 359, 363 (N.M. Ct.
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State v. Martinez2 is the only case to interpret the third sentence of section 30-1 10.13 Martinez was a standard mistrial case, 4 but the court discussed double
jeopardy in very expansive terms.85 The court held that double jeopardy principles
do not preclude retrial after mistrial when that mistrial was requested by the
defendant. 6 The Martinez holding is wholly consistent with federal jurisprudence
on retrial after mistrial.8 7 However, the Martinez court also posited that state double
jeopardy protections "preclude[] retrial of a greater offense only after an acquittal
of that offense." 88 The New Mexico Court of Appeals certified Lynch to the New
Mexico Supreme Court because this language seems contrary to the plain meaning
of article II, section 15.89
IV. RATIONALE AND ANALYSIS
In an opinion written by Justice Minzner,9 ° the New Mexico Supreme Court, in
State v. Lynch, decided that retrial for first-degree murder would not violate the
federal Double Jeopardy Clause because first-degree murder was not charged in the
first trial. 9' It went on to find, however, that the unique language in New Mexico's
double jeopardy statute92 and constitutional provision9 3 does preclude retrial for
first-degree murder under these circumstances. 94 Chief Justice Maes,95 writing for
the dissent, agreed with the majority's federal analysis96 but disagreed with the
court's state analysis.97
A. The Majority's FederalLaw Analysis
98
In keeping with New Mexico's interstitial approach to constitutional analysis,
the majority began with the federal Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause. Had
the court applied a lock-step analysis, as it had in the past,99 or had the court found

App. 1980) ("The legislature, by statute, may not diminish a right expressly provided by the constitution.") (citing
State v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250,316 P.2d 1069 (1957), overruledon other grounds by Wylie Corp. v. Mowrer, 104
N.M. 751, 726 P.2d 1381 (1986)).
82. 120 N.M. 677, 905 P.2d 715 (1995).
83. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 141, 74 P.3d at 85 (Maes, C.J., dissenting).
84. See Martinez, 120 N.M. at 678, 905 P.2d at 717.
85. See id. at 678-79, 905 P.2d at 717-18.
86. Id. at 679, 905 P.2d at 717.
87. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
88. Martinez, 120 N.M. at 678, 905 P.2d at 716.
89. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, I 1, 7, 74 P.3d at 74-75; see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
90. Justice Bosson and Justice Chavez joined Justice Minzner's opinion. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 74 P.3d
73.
91. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 1 11, 74 P.3d at 77; see also supra note 17; infra notes 98-148 and
accompanying text (majority's federal rationale and analysis).
92. NMSA 1978, § 30-1-10 (2003); see supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
93. N.M. CONST. art. I1,§ 15; see supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
94. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 1 14, 26, 74 P.3d at 77, 81; see also supra notes 75 and 80 and
accompanying text; infra Part IV.B (majority's state rationale and analysis).
95. Justice Serna joined in the dissent. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 74 P.3d at 81.
96. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 28, 74 P.3d at 81 (Maes, C.J., dissenting).
97. Id.; see also infra Part IV.C (dissent's rationale and analysis).
98. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text (discussing Gomez and New Mexico's interstitial
approach to constitutional analysis).
99. See State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 1 16, 932 P.2d 1, 6.
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a federal protection," the entire opinion would have been devoted to federal
jurisprudence. Instead, the Lynch court devoted the vast majority of its opinion to
New Mexico law but also provided a basic overview of federal double jeopardy and
cited several federal cases.' 0 '
Despite the fact that Supreme Court cases have interpreted the three traditional
double jeopardy protections to expand beyond areas clearly encompassed by the
wording of the protections, 0 2 the Lynch court's federal analysis was strictly limited
to the three protections and was discussed in very general terms. 0 3 Retrial for firstdegree murder will not put Lynch at risk of multiple punishments because he will
not be punished for both first-degree and second-degree murder; even if both
charges are brought in his second trial, Lynch cannot be convicted of both and, thus,
will not be punished for both.." Although Lynch was originally convicted of
second-degree murder, his protection from retrial after conviction will not be
violated by a charge of first-degree murder because his conviction was reversed.'0 5
Finally, the court found no violation of Lynch's protection from retrial after
acquittal, focusing on the doctrine of implied acquittal."t0
The court reasoned that there was no implied acquittal because first-degree
murder was not charged in the first trial. 0 7 Absent multiple punishments, an unreversed conviction, or an acquittal, either express or implied, the court declined to
find that retrial would constitute double jeopardy under the federal Constitution." 8
The court also reasoned that, since retrial in this instance will "not greatly increase
the expense or ordeal associated with trial," there is no policy reason to prevent
retrial.' 9

100. While the Lynch court found no federal doublejeopardy protection, a closer analysis shows it could have
found otherwise. See infra notes 137-148 and accompanying text.
101. See Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 74 P.3d 73.

102. Double jeopardy law has become increasingly complex and detailed and analysis limited to the three
main protections is not comprehensive. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 32 (1978) (language in Fifth Amendment is

"deceptively plain" and "has given rise to problems both subtle and complex"). Retrial may be prohibited in some
instances despite the lack of either conviction or acquittal, as when the prosecutor voluntarily dismisses a charge
after the jury is empanelled. Id. at 38 (citing Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467 (1973)). On the other hand,

if each of dual sovereigns imposes a punishment on a defendant, double jeopardy is not implicated, although the
defendant will suffer multiple punishments. E.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 192 (1959) (citing Moore
v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 19 (1852) ("[Every citizen] may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and

may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either... .[E]ither or both may (if they see fit) punish
such an offender.")).
103.

Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020,

10, 74 P.3d at 76. The three protections are against retrial after acquittal,

against retrial after conviction, and against multiple punishments for one offense. See supra text accompanying
notes 42-44.
104. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020,

10, 74 P.3d at 76.

105. Id. (citing United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 123 (1966) (no double jeopardy when "the new
indictments occurred only after the vacation of the previous convictions")).
106. Id. (citing Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400,403--04 (1987); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377,391
(1975) (quoting Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 133 (1904)); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191

(1957); Lowery v. Estelle, 696 F.2d 333, 340-42 (5th Cir. 1983)).
107.
108.

Id.
Id. I

9, 11, 74 P.3d at 76.

109. Id. (citing, as an example, United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90-91 (1978)).
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The Lynch court cited Lowery v. Estelle"' for the proposition that offenses are
only impliedly acquitted when they are charged in the first trial."' Lowery, the first
and only case to address the specific federal constitutional issue raised in Lynch,
held that there was no federal double jeopardy violation when a greater offense was
newly charged on retrial after Lowery's successful appeal of the lesser-included
offense." 2 The jury in the first trial had not been instructed on the higher degree, so
the court found no implied acquittal."l 3 The Lowery court found that a "predicate
to a finding of acquittal... is a determination that the fact-finder had a full opportunity to return a verdict" on that charge.'14
Lynch also cited Montana v. Hall" 5 as an analogy to show the lack of implied
acquittal. 1 6 In Hall, the Supreme Court was confronted with somewhat similar
circumstances to those in Lynch. Hall allowed retrial for the same offense" 7 after
reversal on appeal on the ground that the defendant was charged with violation of
a statute not yet in effect at the time of the offense." 8 Hall was first charged with
sexual assault, but he moved for dismissal, arguing that incest was a more
appropriate charge." 9 When the trial court granted Hall's motion, the prosecution
substituted an incest charge for the original sexual assault charge. 12' The incest
statute Hall was charged under, however, was not in effect at the time of the crime,
so his conviction was reversed on appeal, along with a Montana Supreme Court
finding that retrial for sexual assault would constitute double jeopardy.' 2' The Hall
Court indicated in a footnote that there was no implied acquittal because the second
charge was not brought in the first trial. 22 Instead, the Court held that retrial is

110. 696 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1983).
111. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 10, 74 P.3d at 76.
112. Lowery, 696 F.2d at 335.
113. Id. at 340-41 (citing Green, 335 U.S. 184).
114. Id. at 341. Interestingly, a finding that the jury did not have a full opportunity to return a verdict does
not preclude a finding of double jeopardy absent appeal. See supra note 55. The Lowery court's proposition that
on retrial after appeal any charge can be brought so long as it was not acquitted in the first trial is questionable.
Lowery relied on Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977), and Wilson v. Meyer, 665 F.2d 118 (7th Cir.
1981), for its assertion that "[r]eprosecution can proceed on the same or a different statutory violation, regardless
of whether that statutory violation is considered to be the same or a separate offense." See Lowery, 696 F.2d at 340.
Hardwick involved the addition of charges that did not constitute the same offense under the "same evidence" test.
558 F.2d at 297-98. It found no double jeopardy violation because "[tirial on the added counts could not amount
to double jeopardy unless those added counts were the 'same offense' as the originalcounts." Id. at 297. Notably,
in both Lowery, 696 F.2d 333, and Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 74 P.3d 73, the charges added are the same offense
as the original counts. In Wilson, the court held that the defendant "should not be required to waive his valid claim
of former jeopardy as to the nolle prossed felony murder count in order to secure reversal of his conviction under
a separate intent murder count" and did not allow the additional charge to be added on retrial. 665 F.2d at 124-25.
115. 481 U.S. 400 (1987) (per curiam).
116. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 10, 74 P.3d at 76.
117. The Court assumed without deciding that the two statutes charged constituted the same offense, rather
than greater and lesser-included offenses. Hall, 481 U.S. at 405 n.4.
118. Id. at 404.
119. Id. at 401.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 401-02.
122. Id. at 403 n.1. The implied acquittal doctrine was created by Green, 355 U.S. 184. While Hall chose
to distinguish Green because both charges were not brought in the initial trial, there are several other ways the facts
in Hall are different. The Hall court could have distinguished Green on the ground that the offenses were the same,
not "distinct and different" as required by the Green court. See infra note 131. The Hall court could have
distinguished Green on the grounds that the defendant was at fault in necessitating the retrial. United States v. Scott
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permitted after reversal because of a defect in the charging instrument. 123 The Court
found the124defendant's initiation of the error to be of the utmost importance to its
analysis.
The Hall Court reasoned that a contrary holding would result in an absolute bar
on prosecution of this defendant for any offense, despite the clear criminality of his
conduct.'25 The Court declined to find such expansive double jeopardy protections. 126 The main impetus for the decision in Hall is entirely absent in Lynch. In
Lynch, the Defendant did not cause the error, and a finding that double jeopardy
principles preclude retrial for first-degree murder would not prevent retrial and
conviction for second-degree murder. 27 Additionally, in Lynch the prosecution is
not seeking to remedy a defect in the charging instrument by charging the Defendant under an equivalent statute but rather is attempting to add an entirely new and
greater charge on remand, despite
the availability of an adequate charge that does
28
not implicate double jeopardy.
Green v. United States129 was also cited by the Lynch court and is of primary
importance in this Note's analysis of federal double jeopardy protections against
retrial after reversal of another offense. The Green Court's creation of the implied
acquittal doctrine constituted a great change in double jeopardy law. 30 Green held
that conviction of one offense when multiple offenses are charged is an implied
acquittal of the charged offenses on which the jury was silent but no mistrial was
granted.' 3 ' Double jeopardy precludes retrial after appeal on all acquitted offenses,

reasoned that Green could not apply when the retrial was necessitated because "of a defendant who chooses to
avoid conviction and imprisonment, not because of his assertion that the Government has failed to make out a case
against him, but because of a legal claim that the Government's case against him must fail even though it might
satisfy the trier of fact that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96 (1978). In Scott, the
defendant had successfully sought to keep two charges from going to the jury on the ground of preindictment delay,
and the prosecution appealed to have those charges reinstated. Id. at 84. Notably, this situation is parallel to one
of the Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), exceptions discussed supranote 55, when the defendant successfully
avoids consolidation of the charges.
123. Hall, 481 U.S. at 404 (citing, as an example, United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662,672 (1896)). See supra
Part III.A.3. An indictment, information, affidavit, or criminal complaint may function as a charging instrument,
as evidenced by the language in both article 11,section 15, see supra note 75 and accompanying text, and section
30-1-10, see supra note 80 and accompanying text. In this Note, the term "indictment" is used generally to
encompass any charging instrument.
124. Hall, 163 U.S. at 403. While this is not a mistrial case, it is nonetheless consistent with the policy
underlying retrial after mistrial when caused by the defense. See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 513
(1978) (retrial must be permitted "[u]nless unscrupulous defense counsel are to be allowed an unfair advantage");
COOK, supra note 37, § 29:18 ("When a mistrial is necessitated by the behavior of the accused, retrial will not be
barred by the protection against double jeopardy. The same is true when the mistrial is occasioned by the actions
of defense counsel.").
125. Hall, 481 U.S. at 403-04.
126. Id. at 404.
127. See Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020,
4, 26, 74 P.3d at 75, 81.
128. Id. 1 5, 74 P.3d at 75.
129. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
130. Id. at 197. Prior to Green, Trono v. UnitedStates, 199 U.S. 521, 533 (1905), held that appeal of any
conviction waives all double jeopardy protections the defendant had with respect to the entire judgment. Without
expressly overruling Trono, the Green Court limited Trono's holding to cases arising within the Philippine Islands,
making Trono effectively useless as precedent. Green, 355 U.S. at 197.
131. Green, 355 U.S. at 190-91. This is true regardless of whether the charges are the same offense under
the "same evidence" test. The Court found that it did not matter whether the offense impliedly acquitted is included
in the appealed offense so long as the offenses are "distinct and different." Green, 355 U.S. at 194 n.14 (stating
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whether that acquittal is express or implied. 32 Green justified its conclusion with
two independent rationales.' 3 3 First, the Court reasoned that when the jury has a full
opportunity to consider both offenses and convicts on only one, the intent of the
jury is clearly acquittal of the other offense. 3 4 Second, the Court concluded that
under such circumstances the defendant should not be punished for appealing
because permitting retrial of an acquitted offense would have a significant chilling
effect on the defendant's right to appeal.' 35 Green reasoned that courts should not
force a defendant to "barter his constitutional protection against a second prosecution for an offense punishable by death as the price of a successful appeal from an
offense for which he has been sentenced to five to
erroneous conviction of another
' 36
imprisonment."'
years'
twenty
Application of the two Green rationales to the facts in Lynch produces two
3
contrary results. If the holding in Green is that the intent of the jury governs, 1
retrial for first-degree murder will not violate Lynch's double jeopardy protections. 13 While the Lynch court did not expressly adopt this reading, its opinion
makes clear that it considered the intent of the jury to be the most important aspect
of Green. If, on the other hand, the holding in Green is that a defendant does not
waive double jeopardy protections for charges not appealed, 39 the result may be
entirely different. If Lyhch waived his double jeopardy protection for only the
charge he appealed,"4 his double jeopardy protection for first-degree murder ought
to remain unchanged by his appeal.
that second-degree murder may not be a lesser offense included in felony first-degree murder but that

"[ilt

is

immaterial"). Contra CHARLES H. WHrrEBREAD, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 23.6 (1978).

132. Green, 355 U.S. at 188, 190-91.
133. Most cases relying on Green have utilized both grounds. See, e.g., Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 328
(1970) ("A majority of the [Green] Court rejected the argument that by appealing...[one] conviction... the petitioner
had 'waived' his plea of former jeopardy with regard to [another].. charge.... [T]he Court considered the firstjury's
verdict of guilty on [one].. .charge to be an 'implicit acquittal' on [another].. .charge...."). When both offenses are
charged in the first trial, as is usually the case, either ground is sufficient to preclude retrial on the charge about
which the jury was silent. It is only rarely that the prosecution seeks to add a charge on remand, as it did in Lynch.
In such cases, only the second rationale is sufficient for a finding of double jeopardy. Some analyses have focused
on one or the other of these rationales. Compare WHrrEBREAD, supra note 131, § 23.6 ("The state should be
required to prosecute a greater offense and all of its lesser included offenses in one proceeding.") andCOOK, supra
note 37, § 29:32 ("If the conviction is overturned, any reprosecution usually will be limited to charges not greater
than those on which the conviction was obtained."), with LAFAVE ET AL., supranote 52, § 25.4(d), at 686 (stating
that Green may depend on full jury consideration of the greater offense).
134. Green, 355 U.S. at 190-91.
135. Id. at 193-94. Absent appeal, retrial on these charges would be governed by Brown, 432 U.S. 161. See
supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. Retrial would be unlikely given the facts of Green; there is no new
evidence and the defendant could have been convicted in the first trial. The defendant also did not prevent both
charges being brought in the first trial. See supra note 55 (exceptions to the double jeopardy principle that charges
constituting one offense must be brought in one trial).
136. Green, 355 U.S. at 193. Although this reasoning seems to hinge on the increased level of punishment,
the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the degree of penalty is not generally a double jeopardy issue.
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,721 (1969), overruledon othergrounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S.
794, 803 (1989). There is an exception made for the death penalty when initially rejected in a separate hearing
during which the prosecution must prove an additional fact or facts. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446
(1981).
137. See supra text accompanying note 134.
138. No jury has had an opportunity to consider the first-degree murder charge, because it was not brought
in the first trial. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 4, 74 P.3d at 75.
139. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
140. Second-degree murder. See supra note 17.

Summer 2004]

ADDING CHARGES ON RETRIAL

The Lynch analysis does not do justice to the complexity of the problem and the
applicable federal law. The court did not note the alternate rationale in Green. A
close analysis of Green might have led the Lynch court in an entirely different
direction. Had the Lynch court been convinced that the doctrine of implied acquittal
is dependant not on jury intent but rather on the expectation of the defendant in
making the choice to appeal, Lynch's appeal would not have changed his protection
from double jeopardy. Thus, the court would have had to examine federal precedent
governing retrial on a greater offense after a first trial on a lesser-included offense.
Absent his appeal, Lynch's doublejeopardy protection would have been analyzed
under the Brown v. Ohio'' Court's holding that defendants cannot be charged under
a second statute for the same offense 4 2 after an initial trial, but the Lynch court did
not address Brown.la3 Lynch likely could not have been tried for first-degree murder
under Brown had he not appealed.' Brown did note several possible exceptions,'4 5
including one for discovery of new evidence not found prior to the first trial despite
the use of due diligence, which might have pertained, had the Lynch court applied
Brown. 146
A more thorough analysis of federal law might have produced a different result.
Policy considerations, such as preservation of the defendant's right to appeal, generally support a finding that retrial for first-degree murder in Lynch would constitute
double jeopardy.147 The main thrust of Green supports this conclusion: "Conditioning an appeal of one offense on a coerced surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offense [is]... in plain conflict with.. .double jeopardy.' 4 8
The Lynch court's analysis was not necessarily incorrect. The only directly onpoint federal precedent, Lowery, supports the Lynch court's conclusion. However,
Supreme Court precedent allows an alternate holding when carefully examined. The
Lynch court did not closely examine federal law, but its meticulous analysis of New
Mexico law may present a reason. Had the Lynch court been convinced that a
federal protection existed, New Mexico's interstitial approach would have prevented any examination of state law at all.

141. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
142. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (explaining greater and lesser-included offenses).
143. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
144. See supranotes 51-56 and accompanying text. Under the "same evidence" test adopted by Brown, 432
U.S. at 166, the first-degree and second-degree murder charges against Lynch are the same offense and must be
brought together in one trial, as a trial on one will preclude later trial on the other.
145. See supra note 55.
146. See supra note 55. There is some doubt as to whether the Brown exception would have applied absent
appeal. The court in Lynch did not discuss due diligence. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 74 P.3d 73. There is very little
case law applying this exception, and it was not fully argued in Lynch. Cf.State v. Volpato, 102 N.M. 383, 696
P.2d 471 (1985) (motion for new trial based on new evidence discovered after the first trial despite the use of due
diligence may be granted when a number of conditions are met, including that the evidence must be material, not
cumulative, and not discoverable by due diligence prior to the trial).
147. See supra text accompanying note 135.
148. Green, 355 U.S. at 193-94.
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B. The Majority's State Law Rationale
Under New Mexico's interstitial approach, 49 the Lynch court's finding that the
Fifth Amendment does not prevent the state from retrying Lynch for first-degree
murder requires the court to then consider the state law double jeopardy claim.' 50
In adopting the interstitial approach, State v. Gomez' required a party seeking state
constitutional analysis in a case of first impression to preserve its claim by noting
grounds for an independent state claim in trial court.'52 Gomez listed three grounds
for departure' 53 but expressly declined to hold that other grounds would not be
sufficient. 5 4 The Lynch court justified its state analysis on the unique language in
the New Mexico Constitution' and found the state claim had been preserved
in the Defendant's motion for
because this unique language was discussed
156
reconsideration of his double jeopardy claim.

1. No Conflict Between Article II, Section 15 and State v. Martinez
Noting first that the state constitution does provide Lynch protection against prosecution for first-degree murder in this case, the court found that the applicable constitutional provision is not "clear and unambiguous."' 57 The court found the phrase

"again be tried" to be ambiguous.' 5 8 In both the New Mexico Constitution, article
II, section 15' 59 and section 30-1-10,"6° this phrase refers to retrial, prohibited in
specific instances. The Lynch court found that there are two possible interpretations:
(1) the same charge must be tried again in a subsequent trial to implicate double
jeopardy' 6 ' or (2) a second trial must occur to implicate double jeopardy, regardless
' The court agreed with
are brought in the second trial. 62
of whether identical charges
63
interpretation.
latter
the
The Lynch court reasoned that this reading of article H1, section 15 ' 4 is in harmony with the holding in Martinez,165 despite the confusion caused by Martinez
dictum."6 The court reasoned that while in Martinez there was a "manifest

149. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
8, 11, 74 P.2d at 75-77.
150. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020,
151. 1997-NMSC-006, 932 P.2d 1.
152. Id. 1 23, 932 P.2d at 8.
153. "A state court adopting this approach may diverge from federal precedent for three reasons: a flawed
federal analysis, structural differences between state and federal government, or distinctive state characteristics."
Id. 19, 932 P.2d at 7; see supra note 76.
154. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 1 23 n.3,932 P.2d at 8.
155. The New Mexico Constitution has broader language prohibiting double jeopardy than does the United
States Constitution. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Unique language in the state constitution is one of
the approved grounds for deviation from federal constitutional law. See supra note 153.
13-15, 74 P.2d at 77-78.
156. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020,
157. Id. 15, 74 P.3d at 78.
158. Id. U 15-16, 74 P.3d at 78.
159. N.M. CONST. art. IM§ 15; see also supra note 75 and accompanying text.
160. NMSA 1978, § 30-1-10 (1994); see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
161. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020,1 16,74 P.3d at 78. Argued by the prosecution, this construction was rejected
by the Lynch court. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. N.M. CONST. art. 11,§ 15; see discussion supranote 75 and accompanying text.
165. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020,1 17,74 P.3d at 78; see discussion supranotes 82-89 and accompanying text.
166. State v. Martinez, 120 N.M. 677, 678, 905 P.2d 715, 716 (1995). The court of appeals certified Lynch
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necessity"' 67 for mistrial that created a strong public interest in retrial, 6 ' there is no
such policy requiring a first-degree murder charge in the present case.16 9 The Lynch
court further considered the Martinez defendant's suggestion of mistrial to
constitute a waiver of doublejeopardy claims, but Lynch's appeal of second-degree
murder was not a waiver of double jeopardy protections against retrial for firstdegree murder.170 Retrial after mistrial has long been allowed under both the United
States Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution, especially when the mistrial
is suggested by the defendant. 17' Furthermore, the court reasoned that while the state
is entitled to a verdict on all charges presented in one prosecution, as it was in
Martinez, here the prosecution is not entitled to fail to bring all applicable charges
and then add an additional charge after losing on appeal. 72 In distinguishing Lynch
from Martinez, the court
focused on the difference between mistrial and appeal in
173
terms of public policy.
While courts have found a strong public interest in punishing crime, 174 the
interest in ensuring conviction of the greatest possible charge is significantly less.
There is also a strong public interest in protecting defendants from double jeopardy.175 This constraint on the prosecution is not too severe; the State must simply
bring all charges in one trial.' The prosecution should not benefit from its own
error-either in failing to bring 77all charges in one trial or in the trial error that
necessitated reversal on appeal. 1

based on an apparent contradiction between article II, section 15 and the Martinezdictum that double jeopardy is
precluded "only after an acquittal of that offense." Id. The Martinezcourt cited State v. Sneed, 78 N.M. 615, 617,
435 P.2d 768, 770 (1976), to support this proposition. Sneed was an early New Mexico double jeopardy case that
stands for the simple proposition that retrial after reversal on appeal generally does not violate double jeopardy.
Id. at 616-17, 435 P.2d at 769-70. In Sneed, the defendant argued that he could not be retried for first-degree
murder after a reversal of his prior conviction for first-degree murder on the grounds that some admitted evidence
was improper. Id. The court in Sneed relied on State v. Nance, 77 N.M. 39,44,419 P.2d 242, 244 (1966) (retrial
after reversal on appeal on grounds of procedural error is not double jeopardy), and held that double jeopardy was
not implicated. Id. The Sneed court also stated that the defendant was not "acquitted of a crime or a greater degree
of the crime at a prior trial," indicating that, if such had been the case, the result would have been different. Id.
Sneed does not state, however, that double jeopardy is only implicated by acquittal. Id. Martinez improperly
overstated the holding in Sneed, as the court in Lynch asserted. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 17, 74 P.3d at 78.
167. See supraPart Il.A.2.
168. See, e.g., United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1971); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689
(1949); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
169. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 18, 74 P.3d at 78.
170. See id. 18, 74 P.3d at 78-79.
171. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
172. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020,1 19, 74 P.3d at 79.
173. Id. 18, 74 P.3d at 78-79.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463,466 (1964) ("It would be a high price indeed for society
to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment [following a reversible procedural error]."); Wade,
336 U.S. at 689 (policy underlying double jeopardy must sometimes be "subordinated to the public's interest in
fair trials designed to end in just judgments").
175. See, e.g., Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331 (1970) ("To be charged and to be subjected to a second
trial for first-degree murder is an ordeal not to be viewed lightly.").
176. See infra Part V.A.
177. In Lynch's case, the reversible error was in the refusal of the court to give a self-defense instruction.
Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 4, 74 P.3d at 75. Failing to bring all charges in the first trial was a prosecution error.
While the state argued it could not have convicted Lynch for first-degree murder without Ginger Dickinson's
testimony, the responsibility for finding her testimony prior to the first trial lies with the prosecution. Furthermore,
the state in Lynch admitted that it had evidence enough to bring a first-degree murder charge in the first trial but
chose not to go to a grand jury for strategic reasons. Brief in Chief at 7, Lynch (No. 26,252).
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Instead of relying on Martinez, the Lynch court cited a New Mexico case
establishing principles governing retrial after conviction absent appeal.' 78 State v.
Manzanares 79 noted that New Mexico courts most often use the "same evidence"
test 8 ° to determine when a second trial for another charge will constitute double
jeopardy.' 18 Manzanaresalso posited that there may be instances when retrial on a
greater charge after a first trial on a lesser-included offense is not prohibited, such
as when the first trial occurs before "all of the facts necessary to prove the offense
exist." 82 The Lynch court found that Manzanares may apply to cases involving
183
appeals, despite the fact that the parallel federal precedent, i.e. Brown v. Ohio,
was not a part of Lynch's federal analysis.
2. Support Found in Section 30-1-10
The Lynch court supported its conclusion with an examination of New Mexico's
double jeopardy statute. 8 4 The court began by pointing out the differences between
the New Mexico Constitution and the statute: the omission of "upon which any
person has been convicted" and the addition of the word "originally" in the
statute.185 In Lynch's situation, there were two criminal informations, one in the first
trial and an amended information filed on remand. 186 The Lynch court reasoned that
the phrase "indictment, information or affidavit upon which any person is convicted
charges different offenses or different degrees of the same offense,"' 187 seems to
require that the first indictment have multiple charges.' The language in section
30-1-10, on the contrary, "indictment, information or complaint charges different
crimes or different degrees of the same crime'"9 can apply to the indictment on
remand, and, thus, there is no requirement that multiple charges be brought in the
first trial.' 90 The Lynch court reasoned that the addition of the word "originally" in
section 30-1-10 also supports that conclusion because it emphasizes that the
conviction took place in the first trial, without adding parallel emphasis to the
indictment. '9'If the legislature had wanted to limit the court's consideration to the
first indictment, it could have done so by adding the word "originally" in the first
clause.

178. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 19,74 P.3d at 79 (citing State v. Manzanares, 100 N.M. 621,674 P.2d 511
(1983) (allowing a felony trial in district court after a misdemeanor trial in magistrate court because the latter court
did not have jurisdiction over the felony)).
179. 100 N.M. 621,674 P.2d 511 (1983).
180. See supra Part IL.A.1.

181.
(1954)).
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

100 N.M. at 622, 674 P.2d at 512 (citing Owens v. Abram, 58 N.M. 682, 684, 274 P.2d 630, 631
Id. at 622, 674 P.2d 511, 512 (citing Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912)).
432 U.S. 161 (1977); see supra notes 141-146 and accompanying text.
Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 21, 74 P.3d at 79.
Id. 22, 74 P.3d at 79-80; see supra note 79.
Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020,
3, 5, 74 P.3d at 75.

187. N.M. CONST. art. H, § 15.

188.
189.
190.
191.

Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 22, 74 P.3d at 80.
NMSA 1978, § 30-1-10 (1994).
Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 22, 74 P.3d at 80.
Id.

Summer 2004]

ADDING CHARGES ON RETRIAL

The Lynch court also noted that section 30-1-10 was enacted in place of a
previous double jeopardy statute192 that "emphasized a prior acquittal, unlike the
current statute or constitutional provision."' 9 3 The current statute was enacted to
expand the rights provided under the prior statute and under the New Mexico Constitution. 194
3. The Holding in Lynch and a Broader View
State v. Lynch held that both article I, section 15 and section 30-1-10 protect a
defendant from retrial on a greater charge not brought in the first trial when multiple
charges were included in the first indictment and conviction of a lesser-included
offense was reversed on appeal.' 95 In dicta,' 96 the Lynch court expanded its interpretation to include defendants charged with only one offense in the first indictment.' 97 The court reasoned that article II, section 15, not just section 30-1-10,
protects a defendant from double jeopardy when the first indictment has only one
charge,198 despite the fact that article HI, section 15 refers to a situation wherein "the
indictment...upon which any person is convicted charges different offenses or
different degrees of the same offense."1 99 The court in Lynch stated that an initial
indictment with only one charge would be just as much a bar to future prosecution
of a higher count as an initial indictment charging multiple offenses,2" noting that
if a "[d]efendant were only charged with second-degree murder, and no lesserincluded offenses such as manslaughter, this would not operate to remove him from
the protections of the constitution because Article II, Section 15 refers to plural
charges. 2 0 ' Without this interpretation, Article 1I, Section 15 would apply rather
arbitrarily only to defendants initially charged with multiple offenses, regardless of
whether the greater charge was brought in the first trial. 20 2 The court chose to apply
both section 30-1-10 and Article 11, Section 15 to defendants charged with one
offense in their first trial despite the seemingly contrary constitutional language and
the seemingly adequate statutory protection.20 3
From a policy standpoint, it is reasonable to grant defendants protection regardless of the number of initial charges. Since section 30-1-10 seems designed for that
very purpose, it may have been enacted to clarify or expand the protections in
article II, section 15. The Lynch court's holding is justified by the language of

192. NMSA 1941, § 42-705 (1854, repealed 1963).
193. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 23, 74 P.3d at 80.
194. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
195. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 1 15, 21, 74 P.3d at 78-79.
196. Because Lynch was initially charged with an open count of second-degree murder, a charge that includes
manslaughter, see supra note 17, this statement cannot be other than dicta.
197. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 9124, 74 P.3d at 80.
198. Id.
199. N.M. CONST. art. IL§ 15.
200. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 1 24, 74 P.3d at 80.
201. Id.
202. For example, a defendant first charged with only reckless driving would not be protected on remand
after appeal from a charge of reckless homicide. However, if the same defendant were initially charged with both
section 15 would apply and prevent retrial for reckless
reckless driving and resisting arrest in the first trial, article I1,
homicide after appeal. See id.
203. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 9124, 74 P.3d at 80-81.
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section 30-1-10 as well as common sense and public policy, although it seems
unnecessary to rely on article II, section 15 when section 30-1-10 provides adequate
protection from double jeopardy.
C. Rationale of the Dissent
The dissent focused its analysis on the intent of the framers of the New Mexico
Constitution, looking primarily at historical facts including New Mexico's movement toward statehood and the drafting of its constitution. 2 Although Chief Justice
Maes concurred with the majority's federal constitutional analysis, her dissent
reasoned that the prosecution was not barred from charging Lynch with first-degree
murder on remand in this case by either the New Mexico Constitution, article II,
section 15 or section 30-1-10.205
The Lynch dissent began with the history of New Mexico from 1846, when the
Kearny Bill of Rights was promulgated,2 ° until 1910, when the Constitution was
drafted. 20 7 The dissent pointed out the similarity between the language of the federal
double jeopardy provision and that in the first two drafts of the state constitution.2 °8
Chief Justice Maes then reasoned that the new language in the 1910 Constitution
was meant to reject the United States Supreme Court's then recent decision in
Trono v. United States,2° which held that a defendant's appeal of any one conviction constitutes a waiver of double jeopardy protections against retrial for
offenses acquitted in the first trial.21 0 Because Green effectively overruled Trono21 '
when it created the implied acquittal doctrine, the dissent reasoned that there is no
longer a need to interpret the New Mexico Constitution1 2 more broadly than the
federal Constitution on the question of double jeopardy.
The dissent did not note that section 30-1-10 was adopted six years after Green
was decided. 213 It is possible that in adopting section 30-1-10 in 1963 the legislature
intended to espouse the holding in Green, especially given that the Fifth Amendment was not applicable to the states at that time. 2 4 Another interpretation, however, is that section 30-1-10 was adopted to express dissatisfaction at the limitations
in Green.2 5 The fact that section 30-1-10 also contains language that is entirely
new 2 16 indicates that the New Mexico legislature, in adopting section 30-1-10,
intended to provide more expansive state double jeopardy protections.2" 7

204. Id. -t 28-47, 74 P.3d at 81-86 (Maes, C.J., dissenting).
205. Id. 11 28, 45, 74 P.3d at 81, 86 (Maes, C.J., dissenting).
206. See supra note 68.
207. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, In 31-33, 74 P.3d at 81-83 (Maes, C.J., dissenting).
208. Id. 1 32, 74 P.3d at 82 (Maes, C.., dissenting); see supra note 70.
209. 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
210. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, ft 34-36, 74 P.3d at 83-84 (Maes, C.J., dissenting).
211. See supra note 130.
212. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, l 37, 74 P.3d at 84 (Maes, C.J., dissenting).
213. Compare Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), with NMSA 1978, § 30-1-10 (1994).
214. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (finding the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment is applicable to the states).
215. Green may be interpreted as applying only when the jury has a full opportunity to consider the impliedly
acquitted charge. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 79.
217. See supranote 81.
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The dissent went on to reason that the judiciary cannot expand constitutional
rights beyond the intent of the framers," 8 but that rubric has little force in instances
such as this, where the intent of the framers is so unclear.219 The dissent considered
there to be no meaningful difference between retrial after reversal on grounds other
than insufficiency of the evidence and retrial after mistrial for purposes of double
jeopardy.22 It would adopt Martinez as controlling precedent and find no greater
protections based on New Mexico's unique language than those provided under the
Fifth Amendment as interpreted by Green.22'
Rather than addressing the New Mexico Constitution as written, the dissent
speculated as to the intent of the framers almost a hundred years ago and their
possible reaction to a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States,
without any substantiation in the historical record.222 The dissent's finding that the
framers of the New Mexico Constitution intended to adopt the holding in Green is
incongruous given the fact that Green was decided several decades later.223 There
is no reason to assume that the framers would have chosen to remedy the problems
they saw with federal double jeopardy jurisprudence using the method later
developed in Green. Unlike the drafters of the 1910 New Mexico Constitution, the
New Mexico legislature of 1963 may have seen the holding in Green, however; if
intent is the guidepost it should have been the history behind section 30-1-10 that
was discussed.
V. IMPLICATIONS
A. Double Jeopardyin New Mexico
From the time of its initial ratification, the New Mexico Constitution's double
jeopardy clause has contained unique language not found in the Fifth Amendment.224 Until now, the second clause of article I, section 15 and the corresponding
third sentence of section 30-1-10 have not been held to provide greater protections

218. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 1 39, 74 P.3d at 84 (Maes, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v.
Robinson, 57 N.M. 445, 450, 259 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1953) (quoting Bd. of Comm'rs v. State, 43 N.M. 409,
417, 94 P.2d 515, 520 (1939) ("The court has no power by construction to enlarge the scope of constitutional
provisions beyond their intent....") (citing La Follette v. Albuquerque Gas & Electric Co.'s Rates, 37 N.M. 57, 60,
17 P.2d 944,946 (1932) ("Courts will not enlarge the scope of.. .constitutional provisions beyond their intent.")))).
These cases, however, address not a theoretical intent of the framers of the constitution, but an understanding that
the framers must have intended what the plain language of the constitution meant in common parlance; the court
may not interpret constitutional provisions in a way at odds by the clear intent of the framers as expressed by the
constitution's plain language. Both Robinson, 57 N.M. 445, 259 P.2d 1028, and Bd. of Comm'rs, 43 N.M. 409,
94 P.2d 515, found unconstitutional the use of borrowed money for building improvements given the N.M. CONST.
art. IX, §§ 10-11, prohibition on borrowing money for any purpose but building construction.
219. Furthermore, New Mexico legislators may create statutory rights beyond those provided by the
constitution, as discussed supra notes 213-217 and accompanying text.
220. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 144,74 P.3d at 85 (Maes, C.J., dissenting). But see supra notes 171-177 and
accompanying text.
221. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, IR 37, 43, 74 P.3d at 84-85 (Maes, CJ., dissenting).
222. Id. 136-37, 74 P.3d at 84-85 (Maes, C.J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that the recent Supreme
Court of the United States decision in Trono was the driving force behind New Mexico's unique constitutional
language, but no direct evidence was cited. See supra notesl30, 209-212, and accompanying text.
223. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
224. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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than those granted by the United States Constitution.2 25 State v. Lynch, however,
may open the door to more expansive interpretations of New Mexico's double
jeopardy jurisprudence. 226 The second sentence of section 30-1-10,227 for instance,
has not yet been interpreted by any New Mexico court. When it is construed, it may
provide greater protections than those already in place.228
Prosecutors rarely seek to add additional charges on remand; generally, the State
will charge all applicable offenses at once.229 While Lynch seems to foreclose the
possibility that New Mexico prosecutors will ever be able to bring greater charges
on remand, the court may choose to develop exceptions in the future. Indeed, the
Lynch court's citation to State v. Manzanares230 may indicate a willingness to make
exceptions, since Manzanares discusses limitations to a parallel rule. If the New
Mexico Supreme Court later chooses to make exceptions, it may look to
Manzanares and Brown v. Ohio23' for guidance.

Even if no exceptions are fashioned, the holding in Lynch is not too harsh on
prosecutors. If the State cannot, or does not, charge all offenses in the first trial, it
can, on remand, prosecute the charges of which the defendant was originally
convicted, unless the reversal was based on insufficiency of the evidence and thus
constitutes an acquittal.232 The holding in Lynch protects the right of defendants to
appeal and simplifies double jeopardy law in New Mexico by allowing the same
rule to govern retrial regardless of whether the defendant has appealed.
B. Interstitialismand State Sovereignty
The court in Lynch did not depart from New Mexico's interstitial approach to
constitutional analysis as first set out in Gomez.233 Nonetheless, its application in
Lynch is interesting because the federal question was fairly difficult to decide 234 and

225. See supra note 9.
226. While New Mexico has provided greater protections in some areas of double jeopardy, it has not done
so based on the New Mexico Constitution's unique language. See, e.g., State v. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 2 P.3d
264; State v. Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, 16,930 P.2d 792,797 (reasoning that State v. Day, 94 N.M. 753, 617 P.2d
142 (1980), provides greater double jeopardy protections than those under federal law in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456
U.S. 667 (1982)).
227. NMSA 1978, § 30-1-10 (1994) ("The defense of double jeopardy may not be waived and may be raised
by the accused at any stage of a criminal prosecution, either before or afterjudgment."). This language may become
particularly relevant because much double jeopardy jurisprudence relies on a theory of waiver, such as the ability
to retry a defendant after reversal on appeal or after a defendant-requested mistrial. Kepner v. United States, 195
U.S. 100, 131 (1904) ("When... a defendant has been once in jeopardy, the jeopardy cannot be repeated without
his consent...."); see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
228. See Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 25, 2 P.3d at 274 ("The non-waiver provision is especially significant
because federal case law expressly denies a similar interpretation of the Fifth Amendment."); see also supra note
79.
229. As evidence for this, we may look to the scarcity of precedent directly on-point to the issue raised in
Lynch. See supratext accompanying notes 110-114.
230. 100 N.M. 621, 674 P.2d 511 (1983); see supra notes 178-183 and accompanying text.
231. 432 U.S. 161, 165-69 nn.5-7; see supra note 55.
232. Indeed, Martin Lynch eventually pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter on January 23, 2004.
233. Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 1 8, 13-14, 74 P.3d at 75-77 (citing State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006,
22, 932 P.2d 1, 8).
234. The lack of consistent precedent alone makes the federal question a close one. Further, the decision
made must contradict explicit statements made in dicta by the Supreme Court of the United States regardless of
its outcome. Compare Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193 (1957) ("The law... does not place the defendant
in such an incredible dilemma [of waiving double jeopardy protections] as the price of a successful appeal."), with
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because the state question, while not clear or indisputable, presents a solid basis for
independent analysis. Interstitialism provides greaterjudicial efficiency when there
is a federal protection but may have the opposite effect when federal law is unclear,
as it was in Lynch.235 Interstitialism may also serve the dual purposes of unifying
state and federal law and utilizing federal judicial resources by frequent reliance on
federal law.236 However, when state constitutional language is markedly different
from federal law, federal analysis does not help to decide the state question.
Lynch was more efficient and will have greater precedential value because it
resolved this question on state grounds. 237 Had Lynch been decided on federal
grounds, the unique language of article 1I, section 15 would still have no certain
application, and its meaning would still be unclear.238 Had the court been convinced
that there was a federal protection, as it might have been,239 the state question would
not have been reached and this case could have been appealed to the Supreme Court
of the United States on the federal question, eventually making its way back to the
New Mexico Supreme Court for a determination of the state question.24 ° When a
strong state argument exists and the federal question is closer, New Mexico courts
would better achieve judicial efficiency by deciding on both state and federal
grounds.24'
The dissent's reaction to the question raised by Lynch is perhaps even more
troubling than the majority's application of New Mexico's interstitial approach.2 42
Despite the very different language in the New Mexico Constitution, the dissent
reasoned that article H, section 15 ought to be interpreted as an adoption of Green
and nothing more. The dissent ignored the specific language of both article II,
section 15 and section 30-1-10 to make this argument.243 If the dissent's reasoning
had been adopted by the court, it would have been nothing less than a reversion to
the lockstep approach expressly rejected by New Mexico law. 2"
VI. CONCLUSION
State v. Lynch established a double jeopardy protection based on the New
Mexico Constitution, and, in doing so, Lynch safeguarded the defendant's right to

Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400,403 n. 1 (1987) ("[T]here would have been an implied acquittal only if the jury had
been presented with [both] charges.").
235. See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 1 21,932 P.2d at 7 (citing Developments in the Law-The Interpretation
of State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1357 (1982)).
236. See id. 21,932 P.2d at 7-8 (citing State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431,436,863 P.2d 1052, 1057 (1993);
State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 964 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring)).
237. See Michael B. Browde, State v. Gomez and the Continuing Conversation over New Mexico's State
ConstitutionalRights Jurisprudence,28 N.M. L. REV. 387, 406-09 (1998).
238. Prior to Lynch, this language had not been applied in any case. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
The state question would not have been reached absent a finding of no federal protection. See supranotes 149-150
and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 141-148 and accompanying text.
240. See Browde, supra note 237.
241. Id.
242. For discussion of that reaction, see supra Part IV.C.
243. While the dissent does contain a large section entitled "The Plain Language of Article II, Section 15,"
it does not contain a discussion of plain language so much as a summary of existing precedent, namely State v.
Martinez, 120 N.M. 677, 905 P.2d 715 (1995).
244. See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 932 P.2d 1; supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
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appeal without unduly restricting a prosecutor's ability to seek convictions on
appropriate charges and opened the door to further expansive interpretations of New
Mexico's protections from double jeopardy. Beyond the narrow confines of double
jeopardy law, Lynch also serves as an example of how the New Mexico Supreme
Court may apply the interstitial approach to constitutional analysis when the New
Mexico Constitution seems more likely to provide protection than does the federal
Constitution. Ultimately, the Lynch court decided correctly; New Mexico should
not, and now does not, allow prosecutors to add a greater charge on remand after
a conviction of a lesser-included offense is reversed on appeal.

